Are human rights the basis of US policy on Iraq?

During the Iran-Iraq war, the Reagan administration adopted what Secretary of State Charles Schultz called ``a limited form of balance-of-power policy'', specifically allying itself with Iraq both to ensure protection of its oil fields against the new Iranian regime and to bolster an enemy of the Iranian regime so as to counter the threatened destabilization of US friendly regimes in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. It did this specifically through providing Iraq with invaluable intelligence and with billions of dollars in agriculture credits to buy US grain. During 1983 and 1988, the US supplied Iran with more than $500 million per year in credits to purchase US farm produce.

US restored diplomatic relations with Iraq in 1984 (broken in 1967 during the Arab-Israeli war) with full knowledge of Hussein's use of mass execution and torture.

When Hussein acquired between 2,000 and 4,000 tons of chemical agents and began experimenting with the use of gas against Iran, the US did not object. Approximately 195 chemical weapons attacks against the Iranians killed approximately 50,000 people. When the Secretary of State `condemned' this use of gas, more than 3 months after he learned about it, the statement was simply:

``While condemning Iraq's resort to chemical weapons, the US also calls on the government of Iran to accept the good offices offered by a number of countries and international organizations to put an end to the bloodshed.'' (Statement of march 5, 1984 from the State Department Bulletin)

In response, intelligence complained: ``We have demolished a building relationship [with Iraq] by taking a tough position in opposition to chemical weapons.'' (George Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State, p. 239)

Efforts to promote an international treaty banning the use of chemical weapons were blocked by the Washington national security community and allies like West Germany, who were profiting from the sale of chemical agents. The standard US response to continued evidence of the use of chemical weapons was to request more information (somewhat in contrast to GW Bush' insistence that we could not wait for Hans Blix to complete his inspections before invading Iraq in 2003)

In 1987 (still during the Iran-Iraq war), Iraq became the first regime to use chemical weapons against its own citizens. Potential objection to use of gas against the Iraqi Kurds in the North were offset by the argument that the Kurds were guerrilla insurgents, allying themselves with Iran.

After the Iran-Iraq war, consistent intelligence, media evidence and first person witness from US personnel and NGOs confirmed that Iraq was continuing its genocidal campaign against the Kurds in the North, including the use of chemical weapons (gas).

The efforts to condemn Hussein's regime proceeded far further this time than they had in the past (blocked previously because of foreign policy interests in supporting this enemy of US number one enemy Iran in the Iran-Iraq war), leading to a Prevention of Genocide Act and a sanctions Bill. When, however, it actually came to passing this bill, opposition from the White House, the State Department and eventually Congress and the Senate defeated it. Besides the recurrent foreign policy interests, the sanctions bill now raised US trade and agriculture interests. One quarter of the wheat grown in Arkansas and 23% of US rice output went to Iraq. When the sanctions bill came to public attention, several chemical companies inquired how their products might be affected if sanctions were imposed to punish chemical use.

The complex balance of interests was summarised most succinctly in the following internal memo from 1988:

``Human rights and chemical weapons use aside, in many respects our political and economic interests run parallel with those of Iraq.'' (Overview or US-Iraq relations and Political Pressure Points, p. 1)

The US public, other than those representing economic interests, were silent.

As you listen to G W Bush' justification of the invasion on human rights grounds, condemning Saddam Hussein's regime of ultimate cruelty, reflect on the words of the spokesman of the Secretary of State in 1988:

``We want to see those relations continue to develop. Our position that we've taken on chemical warfare, chemical weapons, is in no way intended to diminish our interest in those bilateral relations.'' (Fitzwater, press conference, September 26, 188)

When Bush senior took over the White House in January 1989, his foreign policy undertook a strategic review and, while recognizing the objections of human rights groups, affirmed a further 1 billion in agricultural credits, becoming the 9nth largest buyer of US products. In Secretary of State Baker's words: ``Our administration's review of the previous Iraq policy was not immune from domestic economic considerations.'' (Baker and deFrank, Politics of Diplomacy, p. 263)

In 1987-1988 Saddam Hussein's forces destroyed several thousand Iraqi Kurdish villages and killed close to 100,000 Kurds, nearly all unarmed and many women and children. Since 1983, the US has guaranteed Iraq over